1
The lecture does not only sweep in complex normative and empirical questions concerning the relationship of legal institutions and rules to a capaciously defined concept of "forgiveness." It furthermore aspires beyond the sublunary scholarly task of delimiting and describing. Unconfined to the desiccated philological minutia of a Casaubon, 2 Dean Minow instead approaches her topic with dauntless optimism and eyes fixed firmly on empyrean-minded aspiration. To follow her argument is to be apprised of the possibility of a stronger loving world, and to have one's own parochial and reflexive skepticism-the coin of the realm in the law school workshop-put to shame.
Yet to speak in aspirational terms should not mean dispensing with the question of how a given vision of justice can be attained, or diagnosing with precision the barriers to its realization. 3 So while I share Dean Minow's large ambitions for law as a catalyst for interpersonal and social reform, my commentary here will focus narrowly on the impediments to that ambition. My aspirations here are modest along several margins. To begin with, my aim is narrow in both conceptual and geographical terms. Although Dean Minow anchors her topic with a parsimonious definition of forgiveness as "a conscious, deliberate decision to forego rightful grounds for grievance against those who have committed a wrong or harm," 4 her discussion overflows that definition to touch on several related, but nonetheless distinct, normatively infused concepts. In the course of her exegesis, moreover, she ranges through a set of geographically disparate examples that include transitional justice mechanisms in South Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone; the exercise of prosecutorial 201x]
DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 103 divorce mediation and transitional justice, 8 is comprised of a change in one person's disposition or attitude toward another. 9 It involves a psychological change, and "needs no observable action."
10 Second, on my reading Dean Minow invokes a distinctly institutional concept of mercy. The latter is an official exercise of discretion to mitigate a legal consequence that is otherwise a person's lawful fate.
11 Unlike forgiveness, mercy cannot be a change in dispositions only. It also needs issue in a consequence, typically some sort of forbearance from the implementation of an otherwise permissible civil or criminal penalty. 12 In addition, mercy is often characterized by a measure of particularity, and hence ex ante unpredictability, in its operation. As my colleague and fellow commentator Martha Nussbaum has pointed out, one philosophical tradition of mercy, closely associated with the philosopher Seneca, "entails regarding each particular case as a complex narrative of human effort," and then devoting close, empathic attention to the internal experience of those particulars. 13 The particularity of mercy-its standard-like rather than rule-like character to use the legal argot 14 -distinguishes it from our third category: the more rule-like forms of discretion, such as the familiar criminallaw doctrines of excuse or justification. 15 Where mitigating discretion operates in a wholesale fashion according to crisp rules prescribed ex ante, such as in the treatment of child soldiers under international criminal law described by Dean Minow, 16 then neither forgiveness nor mercy are at stake, but instead excuse or another rule-like form of mitigation.
Each of these concepts-forgiveness, mercy, and excuse-is distinct and freestanding. Each can also be tethered to distinct and different functions for law and legal institutions. Hence, on Dean Minow's accounting, although the state itself cannot forgive-at least in the sense of adopting a new psychological dispensation toward a wrongdoing-it can thus create institutional arrangements that engender opportunities for individuals to forgiveness. 17 For example, it can provide a forum for the mending of personal relationships in divorce and tort disputes. 18 Alternatively, the law can intercede strategically to alter the relationship of whole social groups such as the 8 Minow, supra note 1, at --. 9 On the necessarily interpersonal character of forgiveness, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 248 (1958) (characterizing forgiveness as "dependent upon others"). 10 Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1440 (2004) . 11 Murphy, supra note 7, at 3; see also Markel, supra note 10, at 1436 ("Mercy [is] the remission of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender's offense."). 12 H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352, 353 (1971) . 13 Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, in SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 154, 166-67 (1999). 14 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562 (1992) . 15 Cf. Markel, supra note 10, at 1440-41 (distinguishing mercy from the use of "articulable standards of desert in relation to culpability and the severity of the offense"). 16 Minow, supra note 1, at --. 17 Cf. id. at -(noting the importance of spatial arrangements in transitional justice institutions that allow for proximity between victims and perpetrators, and thus enable forgiveness inducing encounters to occur). 18 Id. at --. [Vol. XX:nnn different races in post-Apartheid South Africa. 19 The state's role here is epistemic: a transitional justice institution that generates disclosures-or, more likely, articulates expressly what hitherto has been a "public secret" 20 -thereby dissolving an impediment to frank and full intergroup recognition, and then enabling forgiveness and social progress. Or finally, the state can itself renounce a civil or criminal penalty against a liable or culpable person, either by announcing a general mitigating rule or by vesting an official with exculpatory discretion. 21 Simply put, society moves on as a practical matter without regard to lingering beliefs and dispositions. In the latter category fall a substantial number of Dean Minow's examples, including the operation of some transitional justice regimes, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute, and the operation of the odious debt doctrine in relation to sovereign debt. 22 In short, just as we can disentangle a number of operative concepts in Dean Minow's account, so too we can conjure a wide array of permutations respecting's law's function.
I am skeptical I can say anything meaningful about so diverse an array of psychological and institutional concepts, let alone about the distinct and different roles that law and legal institutions might play in service of the different concepts. Consequently, I will focus on the one category that strikes me as most interesting, in part because it is likely the one that is most difficult to get off the ground: these are the instances in which the law vests relatively unconstrained discretion in an individual, usually an official, to dispense with an otherwise applicable civil or criminal penalty-in other words the operation of "legal institutions of mercy." 23 In my account, this term captures those legal institutions that are delegated or reserved some measure of discretionary authority to mitigate public law penalties. 24 That discretion can be exercised either wholesale (as a rule-like excuse) or retail (as standard-like mercy). Such entities have special salience in the criminal justice context, but also play a role when the state commits a serious, constitutional wrong.
The reason to focus on a class of predominantly criminal examples is straightforward: it is the hardest case for mitigation, but also arguably where qualities of forgiveness and mercy are most needful. 25 Criminal liability often 
II.
To explore these questions, I believe we are better off focusing on our domestic circumstances rather than the international examples that Dean Minow considers. To establish the bona fides of this analytic shift, I examine here two of her examples-the design and operation of transitional justice institutions and the effects of debt forgiveness-to show that we gain more traction from attention to municipal experience, as opposed to international experience.
Several of Dean Minow's examples of forgiveness or mercy in operation, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute, concern instances of "transitional justice," which has been defined as "the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes."
28 Transitional justice institutions include both truth commissions akin to the TRC, 29 and also criminal prosecutions of former regime officials. As a threshold matter, it is important to resist the temptation to see transitional justice as a sui generis problem. Transitional justice is not analytically distinct from "ordinary" justice, which must also "routinely cope with policy shifts caused by economic and technological shocks and by changes in the value judgments of citizens and legal elites." 31 At the same time, there may be reason to believe that examination of the delimited class of cases labeled "transitional" will yield only limited generalizable lessons, and that an analysis of the law's relationship to forgiveness gets off the ground more easily, and with more sure-footed results, by starting in a more mundane municipal context.
The first problem is that the number of truth commissions (twentyeight) 32 and international criminal courts (at best no more than ten) 33 is relatively small. Each example of transitional justice is characterized by sharply distinct socio-economic, geopolitical, and historical-institutional variance. Efforts to understand why forgiveness or mercy works in one context but seemingly not in others is therefore handicapped by the need to untangle the distinct effect of legal institutions from a host of other background dynamics. As Dean Minow candidly concedes, therefore, efforts to generalize from historical experiences of transitional justice confront considerable identification hurdles.
34
Even the case studies upon which Dean Minow focuses upon yield few unambiguous lessons. Consider here her analysis of the South African TRC.
35
To reach a judgment about the social value of the TRC-its capacity to knit together the frayed bonds of social fabric across racial lines-it is worth going beyond the assessment Dean Minow offers of its direct consequences. It is also necessary to examine its opportunity costs. The TRC required the allocation of considerable human, institutional, and fiscal capital in the early days of the post-Apartheid transition. Even if we are focused narrowly on the prospects for restoring a social fabric frayed or eviscerated by racial discrimination, as Dean Minow appears to be, there is an important question about how alternatively the human and material resources used for the TRC could have been deployed to build social capital and cohesion. The question has force because the South African state today routinely fails to supply the basic public good of security 31 37 While the wealthy purchase private security, a large impoverished (and mostly black and colored) majority is left to their own devices, thus creating a "hegemony of the very same social groups that held sway under apartheid" at the expense of "the very same groups cast out by the logic of white supremacy."
38
A recent empirical study of police and state legitimacy in South Africa that I conducted with colleagues from Oxford University, the London School of Economics, and the Human Sciences Research Counsel in Durban demonstrates that state failure in this regard has led directly to a substantial drop in the legitimacy of the police and the state. 39 Drawing on a nationally representative sample of 3,183 citizens, that study found stark racial and economic divisions in judgments of the legitimacy of the state. 40 In effect, "whites are considerably more likely to feel they have a duty to obey the police than black South Africans," in part because the latter are more likely to perceive the police as being ineffectual in dealing with violent crime. 41 The racially disparate delivery of security from crime as a public good, in short, has direct effects on perceptions of the legitimacy of the state. 42 Rather than uniting citizens, the state thus effectively drives an emotional and affective wedge between whites and blacks.
It could be inferred from this that post-Apartheid criminal justice institutions have not only failed their basic mission, but that they have failed in a way that reproduces the stark racial divides that characterized Apartheid society. 43 To the extent that the goal of transitional justice institutions such as the TRC were aimed at reconstituting social relations without subordinating racial hierarchies, it is therefore fair to ask whether the ensuing allocation of resources was wise. It may well be that South Africa's limited pool of legal 36 In 2011, about 50 murders, 100 rapes, almost 400 armed burglaries, and more than 500 violent assaults were reported every day in South Africa. 42 Id. at 257 (figure 2, reporting relationship of police effectiveness and legitimacy). 43 The state's response instead may have done more harm than good to racial equality. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 37, at 9 (noting police reliance in black townships upon "high density, high mobility, paramilitary policing" to vindicate social order). Evidence of how corrosive state failure to provide security against crime is to legitimacy is available beyond the South African context. expertise and institutional capital may well have been better assigned to building fair and noncorrupt police and judicial institutions for millions of black South Africans, rather than to enabling a mere 429 people 44 to confront their past. To think that transitional justice is the path to social reintegration and racial harmony is to ignore the quotidian experiences of millions of ordinary South Africans.
The point here can be generalized: transitional justice institutions are often established in the wake of particularly severe governance shocks, and coincide with a need for substantial reconstruction, or construction ex nihilo, of legal institutions. Scarcity of financial resources, not to mention of legal and human capital, may be far more acute in transitional justice contexts than in the operation of ordinary criminal justice systems. As a result, the effect of transitional justice investments upon the values that Dean Minow emphasizes is not a simple matter, but rather is contingent on complex questions concerning the alternative uses of resources in developing effectual justice institutions. Judgments about forgiveness-related legal investments raise especially nettlesome questions in delicate moments of political transition. To offer predictions about how the law can be employed to promote forgiveness or produce mercy, therefore, a focus on ordinary domestic institutions of criminal justice may be warranted. Although opportunity costs exist in these circumstances, more possibilities obtain for observing how different institutional choices achieve or retard normatively desirable goals are greater. Lessons in institutional design may also be more generalizable because of greater regularities in the basic aims and operation of domestic criminal justice systems, as opposed to the high variance circumstances of transitional justice.
Similar concerns can be offered about Dean Minow's sovereign debt example. Here, the problem of adequate numerosity to reach judgments with external validity is especially acute. Beyond the 1932 Tinoco arbitration between Costa Rica and Great Britain, 45 crisp exemplars of odious debt forgiveness are hard to discern. 46 Moreover, as Dean Minow candidly recognizes, even if such a doctrine obtained, its consequences are uncertain. 47 It seems perilous to deploy what little international experience exists as the ground to build the general proposition that the legal mitigation of debt can yield valuable social change. To do so when less fragile ground is available seems unnecessary. 44 Minow, supra note 1, at --. 45 
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Further, it is unclear whether Dean Minow need resort to a controversial rara avis of international law to advance her argument. Price Fishback, Kenneth Snowden, and Jonathan Rose have recently demonstrated that the New Deal era Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) programs, purchasing loans from private lenders and refinancing them on easier terms, had substantial benefits to home owners at a time of large dislocation and economic distress. 48 More recently-and inspired by HOLC's experienceArif Mian and Amir Sufi have argued that a greater willingness to write-down underwater mortgage debt after 2008 would have both reduced the extent of the recession and blunted its welfare effects. 49 Although defended by both sets of authors in narrow welfarist terms, debt reduction in both historical eras likely advanced the wider set of values Dean Minow considers salient.
Moreover, American historical experience with debt reduction not only supports the arc of Dean Minow's general argument, it also yields a useful cautionary lesson about how debt forgiveness can be implemented to exacerbate other social harms. Although HOLC refinancings were accomplished in relatively even-handed ways, HOLC's scheme for rating neighborhoods based on their racial composition was taken up by the Federal Housing Authority and deployed to make first-time home purchases cheaper for whites than for blacks. 50 More recently, the federal government's failure to press for mortgage write-downs in the wake of the 2008 recession must be understood against the back-drop of a highly racialized targeting of subprime lending, and a consequent pattern of foreclosures and economic distress in which African-Americans and Hispanics fared far worse than whites. 51 The domestic experience of debt and debt relief, in short, is far richer and far more morally charged than its international counterpart, 52 and thus provides much richer loam for nourishing, and setting bounds to, Dean Minow's argument. 48 
III
In the balance of this commentary, I turn to the domestic criminal justice context and ask whether analytic purchase can be obtained there concerning the law's capacity for cultivating forgiveness and enacting mercy. That experience is especially rich because the Constitution encompasses no less than four institutional seats of merciful discretion. First, there is the discretionary equitable authority possessed by federal courts under Articles I and III.
53 Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an almost unbounded equitable discretion on the part of prosecutors to ascertain what criminal charges to bring or not bring. 54 Third, the executive has seemingly untrammeled authority to pardon criminal offenses. 55 And finally, the grand jury requirement of the Fifth Amendment and the petit jury rule of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 56 both create instruments with what at first blush seems discretionary authority to exercise mercy and to remit criminal punishment.
The Constitution, then, contains an embarrassment of merciful riches. Yet close examination of these four discrete institutional sites of discretionary authority at work today reveals not one that is, in fact, capable of suttling mercy or catalyzing forgiveness in a meaningful fashion. Nor is it clear any one could. Each of these institutions' powers has been narrowly construed, or hedged around with disabling institutional counterweights. Each consequently falls short of the redemptive ambitions glimpsed by Dean Minow. The reason for this, I will argue, roots back to the democratic pedigree of legal authority in the United States, and the tendency of political economies that provide occasions for mercy to simultaneously stifle the instruments of mercy.
To pursue this argument, I will focus primarily on American experience with equitable judicial discretion and with prosecutorial discretion, the two sites of merciful discretion that have proved responsive to democratic pressures in interesting ways despite their notional separation from democratic politics. Yet it is worth pausing briefly before turning to these institutions, and noting the current state of presidential pardoning and juries as means of implementing merciful mitigation. In brief, the current state of presidential pardons and jury is penurious and threadbare in the extreme. The presidential pardon has dwindled to a shadow of its former self. 57 The grand jury, while 53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, art. III, § 2 (respectively the Suspension Clause and the grant of power to hear all cases "in Law and Equity" formally a check on prosecutors, is largely ineffectual, 58 except as a means of muffling and deflecting responsibility for controversial charging decisions.
59
The petit jury is a vestigial remnant of our adversarial system of criminal justice, 60 now long superseded by a plea bargaining process wholly within the prosecutor's control. 61 Even in those instances in which a jury trial occurs, the scope of discretion enjoyed by ordinary citizens against the state is limited.
62
Whereas their Founding era analogs would have enjoyed a plenary "right and power to consider legal as well as factual issues," 63 today a juror who claimed authority to resist the court's direction on matters of law would be met at best with reprimands and at worst criminal sanctions.
64
If pardons and jurors play no meaningful mitigation function today, their respective desuetudes are nevertheless illustrative of two slightly different ways in which legal institutions of mercy are extinguished. Whereas the pardon has been abandoned under political pressure and without institutional change, the role of the jury has been hedged in by institutional changes, such as the rise of plea-bargaining, and legal reform, such as the rejection of jury discretion over matters of law and the criminalization of jury nullification demands. The decline of these legal institutions of mercy evinces on the one hand a tension with democracy, and on the other hand a tendency for professionalized institutions that are systemic repeat-players-here, prosecutors and judges-to crowd out institutions drawn by sortation from a larger democratic pool. Mercy is vulnerable to both democratic and technocratic pressure.
In contrast to the null results an analysis of juries and pardons yields, the trajectory of the equitable judicial discretion and prosecutorial discretion is rather more complex. In sketching brief accounts of how both fail to further Dean Minow's ambitions, I necessarily simplify, offering snapshots rather than comprehensive accounts of complex institutional phenomena.
visited Jan. 19, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm. Even these statistics understate the expected role of the pardon power, which was used with much greater frequency in the early Republic to make "exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt. We can usefully begin with what upon first impression might seem the more promising locus of merciful discretion-the equitable discretion of the federal courts. Two textual elements of the Constitution warrant the conclusion that federal courts possess a measure of discretionary equitable authority: Article III's reference to "equity" 65 jurisdiction originating in the English Court of Chancery, 66 and Article I's Suspension Clause, 67 which referenced by implication the traditionally equitable remedy of habeas corpus. 68 Although the systems of law and equity have been merged for almost 80 years now, 69 it remains the case that courts must often exercise a "flexible and comprehensive" 70 discretion in determining the scope of public law remedies, including but not limited to habeas corpus. To understand the possibility of the federal courts as "legal institutions of mercy," therefore, we can usefully examine the manner in which judges have exercised their discretion to calibrate not just the equitable remedy of habeas, but more generally the suite of public law remedies used to maintain the state within constitutional bounds.
71
Beginning with habeas, an analysis of judicial discretion in the design of public law remedies reveals that courts have not exercised their equitable authority in ways to advance Dean Minow's normative goals. The equitable writ of habeas corpus, in its pure form, is meant to be a remedy against executive detention. operation has been at best anemic and at worst counterproductive. Perhaps the highest profile site of detention without ex ante process in recent years has been the Guantánamo Naval Bay, which stood largely unregulated by the courts until the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush.
73
That intervention, however, cannot be ranked a success. The Court's intervention in Boumediene came after a majority of detainees had been released. 74 Moreover, the decision precipitated a sharp and immediate decline in the rate of releases-one that continues to this day. 75 It is likely that this deceleration in release rates is due not so much to Boumediene, but to the mounting congressional opposition to detainee releases that emerged only once President Obama entered office. 76 From 2009 onward, Congress attached riders to annual defense authorization measures categorically barring the transfer of detainees to the United States, and also barring transfers to other countries without an onerous Secretary of Defense certification. 77 Without any formal suspension of the habeas remedy, congressional foes of the president have flexed democratic muscles and dramatically limited the efficacy of the writ.
Worse, the timing of judicial intervention has changed the law of national security detention in a way deleterious to libertarian goals. My own ongoing analysis of the government's own documentation for detainees reveals that by the time the Court had intervened, a substantial number of the detainees with the strongest claims to freedom had already been released. 78 This means that the pool of remaining detainees who could proceed with post-Boumediene habeas proceedings systematically possessed more indicia of terrorist risk than the overall Guantánamo detainee population. As a result, the substantive and evidentiary law of detention that has developed through post-Boumediene district and circuits courts in the District of Columbia suffers from a selection effect: it is based on judicial review of a sample of cases that are systematically riskier than the randomly drawn detainee from the population. It is not implausible to think that the underlying jurisprudence will be at least sub rosa animated by the judges' gestalt impression of the detainees who parade before them on habeas. 79 Boumediene has had in the short time, 80 it's long term effect may be to lower the price of liberty deprivations.
The inefficacy of habeas is not limited to the national security context. In the less noticed immigration context, habeas once served an extensive role in promoting legality at the border. 81 Today, it has been all but abolished by statute, 82 and leaving non-citizens potentially subject to "expedited" forms of removal that preclude judicial review of most constitutional issues. 83 Nor has postconviction variant of the Great Writ better survived the rigors of democratic attention. Rather, as I have explored at length elsewhere, 84 the scope and effective power of postconviction habeas review has been winnowed by both legislated changes, in particular the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 85 and the minatory attitude of a Court that sees scant value in ensuring state courts' compliance with constitutional rules. 86 As a consequence of these legislated and judicially wrought changes, a vanishingly small proportion of habeas petitioners even obtain merits review of their claims, let alone relief, 87 even as application of reticulated gatekeeping rules sucks up judicial energy, thereby deepening the bench's disaffection with postconviction review. 88 order releasing a detainee who is likely to return to terrorism …. I doubt any of my colleagues will vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter." Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring). 80 Huq, What Good, supra note 74, at 410-11 (discussing the small number of detainees released as a consequence of habeas's operation). 81 
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Even if the equitable powers of the federal courts are notable largely by their absence from habeas jurisprudence, this does not mean that such discretion is not exercised. To the contrary, to step back and consider not just habeas but the full range of public law remedies for constitutional violations is to understand that the Supreme Court does routinely exercise large equitable discretion of a merciful character in the design of public law remedies. The object of mercy, however, is not the victim of constitutional harms. To the extent federal courts today exercise a merciful form of equitable discretion in public law, it is not to enable social cohesion or to redeem historical injustice. It is instead to exculpate the errors of the state. Dispensation from the consequences of wrongful action is to be found in the widening gyre of absolute and qualified immunity. 89 It is in the deepening shadow of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, 90 most recently exemplified by the Court's willingness in Heien v. North Carolina, 91 to permit a Fourth Amendment violation to go without remedy because a police officer's failure even to know what the law he was enforcing required was "reasonable" if "not … perfect." 92 Heien's contrast with the Justices' unforgiving, even contemptuous, attitude to citizens' mistakes of law almost perfectly illustrates the distribution and quality of the Justices' empathic investments. 93 Equity in judges' hands, in sum, exculpates noncompliance with the Constitution and so facilitates state coercion. It provides no platform for forgiveness or exemplar of mercy.
The second site of constitutional mercy meriting consideration here is the equitable discretion of the prosecutor not to pursue charges in a criminal case, an authority that has received a constitutional imprimatur without substantial limits. 94 rules, but also flowed from the shift to determinate sentencing regimes such as the federal sentencing guidelines 95 coupled to a persistent failure to control "fact-bargaining" between prosecutors and defense attorneys out of reach of judicial oversight. 96 So far as criminal penalties go, therefore, it is more appropriate to look at prosecutorial behavior than judicial conduct to take the full measure of how discretionary authority is wielded.
Prosecutorial discretion under the current criminal justice dispensation has elicited divergent assessments. In net, however, it cannot be said to further Dean Minow's goals related to mercy or forgiveness. On the one hand, the sheer breadth of state and federal criminal law, coupled to the inevitable resource constraints upon a criminal adjudicative system, lead to systematic "leniency." 97 In some instances, prosecutorial charging discretion operates as an offsetting counterbalance to legislative punitiveness. Empirical studies of the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and New Jersey found that prosecutors "changed their practices to avoid imposition of mandatory penalties, that the harsher punishments were imposed in the remaining cases, and that overall there were no effects on conviction rates." 98 On the other hand, the rise of prosecutorial discretion since the 1970s coincided with an unprecedented four-fold leap in the incarceration rate. 99 Worse, the most sophisticated recent study of discretion in the criminal justice contexts not only finds substantial racial disparities after controlling for offense conduct, but also concludes that "half" of those disparities "can be explained by the prosecutor's initial charging decision-specifically, the decision to bring a charge carrying a 'mandatory minimum.'" 100 No less than courts, chief executives wielding the pardon pen, grand juries, and petit juries, prosecutors are not a promising site for mitigating discretion-at least in the absence of resource constraints that leave then no choice but to forego indictments.
To pardoned four capital prisoners and commuted the sentences of the remaining 167 individuals on death row. 101 But the Ryan commutation yields a clue to why institutional mercy is so rare: Ryan was at the end of his term, and feared no democratic reprisal. 102 To the contrary, the "undemocratic" character of his action was a central theme in the loud criticism his action elicited. 103 In the American political system, democratic sentiment-directly or indirectly, and to greater or lesser extents-animates the unforgiving cast of prosecutorial discretion, the demise of pardons and jury nullification, and the calcification of judicial equity that I have described. It is only via the direct election of state prosecutors, the electoral reward that flows to legislators for promising evermore punitive policies, and the president's selection of Supreme Court Justices who will be tough on crime that institutional form could have been given to the "relentlessly punitive spirit [that] has been ascendant in the United States for more than a generation." 104 Further, it is a paradox of American popular government that democratic pressure at the aggregate level has likely contracted local opportunities for democracy via juries. Public punitiveness, that is, translates as an expansion in criminal liability and harsh, mandatory sentences. This in turn compels a shift to pervasive plea-bargaining, and crowds out petit juries, while rendering grand juries mere processing mills for indictments. So it is that the Constitution's success as a democratic regime causes our legal institutions of mercy to flicker and falter notwithstanding their constitutional foundations.
Yet if legal institutions of mercy have been increasingly extinguished across the American body politic today, it is not for want of compelling need. Rather, America's incarceration rate is almost four times that observed in the next most punitive Western democracy.
105
Its social cost falls disproportionately on African-American families, widening extant gulfs in economic equality. 106 Its gains, especially at the upper margin of punitiveness, are uncertain. 107 The punitive urge thereby satisfied is, perhaps unsurprisingly, more closely correlated to racial intolerance than fear of crime or a 101 Durkheimian concern with maintaining social cohesion. 108 This punitive political economy, moreover, has only strengthened those interest groups that oppose mercy, sapping the electoral power of geographic communities that would oppose it. 109 Reasonable disagreement obtains as to whether ongoing debates about criminal justice will prove an inflection point in the development of American attitudes to punishment. 110 Whatever the path of American criminal justice, it seems tolerably clear that the positive feedback loops of the contemporary carceral state's political economy mean that correcting its errors or extinguishing its perverse or excessive consequences only becomes more difficult with time.
111 Just as American institutions are most in need of legal institutions of mercy, therefore, their democratic pedigree means they are least likely to keep hold of the ones bequeathed to them by the Constitution. . In a more recent book, Gottschalk emphasizes these factors, but also underscores the political problem that "a safe healthy, and humane penal system is generally not considered a credible and desirable policy goal on its own," in part because of a dominant ideological system she labels "neoliberalism. (2008) . In that essay, Barkow rejects political economy explanations, and instead argues that "the rise of the administrative state has made unchecked discretion an anomaly in the law." Id. at 1334. Although I do not question the notion that claims about unchecked discretion play some role in the public discourse concerning mercy, see, e.g., SARAT, supra note 101, at 27, her sole focus on that role is not wholly persuasive for a range of reasons. First, Barkow does not account for the frequency and density of discretion that obtains without much contestation within the administrative state. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1107-31 (2009). It is therefore not clear that prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution context is as distinctive as she claims. Second, while Barkow tries to distinguish the case of prosecutorial discretion on the ground prosecutors are more "accountable," see Barkow, supra, at 1353, this does not explain federal prosecutors, who are not elected and whose connection to the electorate via Main Justice and the Attorney General may be more or less loosely articulated. Finally, attention to the moment in our national political discourse at which discretion goes from being uncontroversial to divisive-consider here the Ryan commutation or, more recently, President Obama's experience with immigration enforcement-suggests that it is less the fact of discretion, and more the manner in which that discretion is used that engenders public hostility. Hence, in the immigration case, discretion has long characterized immigration enforcement: It became controversial only when pivotal political actors found it advantageous to make an issue of it. It is not clear any analogous story of issue mobilization can be told about prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice context. Barkow's 201x] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 119
IV
What then might an advocate of legal institutions of mercy-as I take Dean Minow to be-draw by way of inference from this account of our law's indigenous capacity for mercy and other forms of mitigating discretion? I can conjure two inferences from our own democracy's entanglements with mercy.
To begin with, theorists from St Anselm 113 to Jeffrie Murphy 114 have observed a tension between the demands of justice and the exercise of mercy. The above analysis suggests a further tension between the demands of democratic rule and merciful discretion. As the late Dan Markel eloquently argued, mercy "stands at odds with the nature of the modern liberal democratic regime under rule of law." 115 The essence of democratic government is representation of the people. To represent in a democratic register, whether as delegate or trustee, 116 is not to act upon unbounded caprice. It is to be constrained by some view of what the people want or need. Markel dissolved this problem by pointing to the democratic character of our merciful institutions. 117 The problem, however, is more difficult than he made it out to be, not least because it begs what is colloquially known as the dead-hand problem. 118 To the extent democracy remains our desideratum, a historically entrenched constitutionalism can be justified as a limit on current majorities so long as it serves some other value. 119 It is not enough to say that a legal institution of mercy has a constitutional pedigree, therefore, without explaining why it is justified as an exception from contemporaneous democratic rule.
Second, more modestly but perhaps more importantly, recent American experience points to a deep functional incompatibility between democracy and the discretionary provision of merciful dispensation from legal punishments. There is, I have argued, a negative correlation between the tendency of democratic political economies to generate a need for merciful discretion and the capacity of legal institutions of mercy to operate. This account, in short, focuses on a value (legality) that matters to scholars, and assumes without warrant that it matters equally to members of the general public. 113 dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is feasible for the living to depart from arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our generation participated in little of the process responsible for the text; and that the Constitution is otherwise imperfect for our time."). 119 A constitution's dead hand can serve contemporary democracy too, for example by supplying an off-the-rack set of institutional frames for elective choice, which then do not have to be recreated from scratch with each new iteration of democratic choice. Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2014). Legal institutions of mercy cannot be vindicated in these prodemocratic terms.
